Over the previous two decades, Australia has witnessed noticeable economic changes. In particular, this period of sustained economic growth led to a substantial increase in real incomes. As recent empirical evidence shows, however, the rise in average living standards was accompanied by an increase in net income inequality and in the concentration of incomes at the top of the distribution (Wilkins 2014 , Greenville et al. 2013 , Atkinson and Leigh 2007) . Importantly, these changes in the mean and dispersion of incomes occurred in a period of signi…cant policy changes, especially with respect to the tax and bene…t system. In fact, the previous two decades saw the implementation of major …scal reforms, which included, among other things, changes to the income tax rates and thresholds, as well as, the tightening of the access to welfare payments and reductions in withdrawal rates of means-tested bene…ts (Australian Senate 2012, Goodger and Larose 1999). Although, in this context one would naturally wonder what was the role of …scal reforms in the changes in income distribution and redistribution, this remains largely an unexplored issue. The aim of the present paper is to …ll this gap by (i) presenting more evidence on these recent trends and (ii) by assessing the role played by …scal reforms.
First, we study the trends in the redistributive impact of the income tax and bene…t system in Australia between 1994 and 2009. We report standard measures of the redistributive e¤ects of taxes, bene…ts and taxes and bene…ts combined. We show the separate contributions of taxes and bene…ts to overall income redistribution, as well as, the respective roles of the size and progressivity of taxes and bene…ts. We show that these reforms altered the functional relationship between pre-…scal and post-…scal incomes by modifying the budget constraints and the e¤ective tax rates faced by di¤erent households along the income distribution.
Evidence on the trends in redistribution and the e¤ect of policy reforms on redistribution over the recent decades is limited. Whiteford (2013, p. 39) computes the redistributive e¤ect of income taxes and bene…ts between 1981 and 1996, and …nds little change over that period. Using data from the SIHC and the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, Wilkins (2014, p. 82) shows that the redistributive impact of taxes and bene…ts somewhat decreased between 1994 and 2009. These studies, however, are silent on the distributive consequences of policy reforms as they examine the trends in income redistribution without controlling for the changes in the distribution of market income that occurred over the period.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a clear assessment of the impact of these policy reforms on income redistribution. Our analysis recognizes that any measure of redistributive e¤ect or progressivity depends on the tax-bene…t policy parameters but also on the distribution of income to which taxes and bene…ts are applied. We evaluate the e¤ect of tax-bene…t policy reforms using the …xed-income approach proposed by Kasten et al. (1994) . This approach allows us to derive time-trends in the redistributive e¤ects and in the progressivity 1 of taxes and bene…ts in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes. This is done by applying the tax and bene…t schemes of di¤erent periods to a common distribution of income which allows intertemporal comparisons of tax-bene…t policies while controlling for concomitant changes in market incomes. We …nd that although their impact was limited, the tax-bene…t reforms contributed to the decline in the redistributive e¤ect of the system in the 2000s. Changes in the distribution of market income played an important role. These results hold regardless of the distribution of income taken as reference and are robust to the choice of the equivalence scale and the degree of aversion to inequality.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the measurement framework used to measure the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-bene…t system and the contribution of taxes and bene…ts to overall redistribution. In Section 3, we present the data and the features of interest of the tax-bene…t calculator. In Section 4, we discuss the changes in the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-bene…t system between 1994 and 2009. Section 5 focuses on the role of policy reforms. First, we discuss the main policy reforms implemented during this period and their e¤ects on the relationship between pre and post-…scal incomes.
Second, we present the results from the …xed-income approach to evaluate the e¤ects of policy reforms. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
Measurement Framework
We anaylse the changes in the redistributive e¤ect of the Australian tax-bene…t system using a simple decomposition that allows us to quantify the separate contributions of taxes and bene…ts to overall redistribution. As is common in the literature on income redistribution, we focus our analysis on Gini-based measures. 2 For the present analysis,
we adopt the widely-used measure of the redistributive e¤ect proposed by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and extended by Urban and Lambert (2008) . The redistributive e¤ect of taxes, bene…ts, or net taxes (taxes minus bene…ts) is given by:
where G X is the Gini index of pre-…scal income and G N is the Gini index of post-…scal income after tax, bene…t, or net tax. Following Lambert (2001) and Kim and Lambert (2009) , we consider market income (pre-tax and bene…t) as our pre-…scal income variable for the computation of the redistributive e¤ect of net taxes and of bene…ts, whereas for income taxes the pre-…scal variable is gross income de…ned as the sum of market income plus bene…ts. 3 Table 1 shows the correspondence between pre and post-…scal variables and the di¤erent income variables for taxes, bene…ts and net taxes. 2 For a review of the decompositions methods that have been proposed to evaluate the redistributive e¤ect of …scal systems see Urban (2009) . 3 In the case where some bene…t payments are taxable, income taxes paid by some individuals may be larger than their market income. This rules out the use of market income as the pre-…scal income for the computation of standard measures of redistributive e¤ects. The income variables, their components, and the data used to derive them are discussed in Section 3.
Within this framework, the redistributive e¤ect of net taxes, RE N T , can be expressed as a function of the separate e¤ects of taxes and bene…ts as:
where RE T and RE B are the redistributive e¤ects of taxes and bene…ts, respectively. In order to understand changes in redistribution, it is useful to distinguish the separate impact of bene…ts and taxes. Following Kakwani (1977 Kakwani ( , 1984 , we express the redistributive e¤ects as a function of the size and progressivity of taxes and bene…ts minus the e¤ect of reranking:
where t and b are the average tax and bene…t rates de…ned as the proportion of aggregate pre-…scal income paid in taxes and received in bene…ts, respectively; P T is the progressivity of taxes as measured by Kawani's disproportionality index and jP B j is the absolute value of the index for bene…ts; and R T and R B are the measures of reranking that capture the changes in the ranking of tax units by income in the transition from pre-to post-…scal income. 4 Kakwani's progressivity measure is de…ned as the di¤erence between the concentration index of taxes or bene…ts and the Gini coe¢ cient for pre-…scal income, G X :When taxes are progressive, the concentration curve of taxes lies below the Lorenz curve of income which implies a positive value of P K . In the case of bene…ts, a negative value of the index indicates progressivity. This is because progressive bene…ts are more concentrated at the bottom so that their concentration curve is above that of income. 4 The reranking introduced by taxes or bene…ts is obtained as a residual. It measures the di¤erence between the concentration index of post-…scal incomes, computed with units ranked according to pre…scal incomes, and the Gini coe¢ cient for post-…scal incomes, G X . For a discussion on these measures see Urban (2009 The market income variable is derived from SIHC data and it includes the value of wages and salaries from all jobs, own unincorporated business income, investment income including interests, rents, and dividend income, private pensions, and other types of private income. The self-employed are considered in the anlysis and negative values for 5 As documented by Wilkins (2014) , there were some changes in the SIHC in the 2000s and it is impossible to construct fully consistent income series for the 1994-2010 period. We use the most consistent measures provided in these surveys. In particular, we use a measure of wage and salary income that consistently excludes salary sacri…ce and a measure of business and investment income that consistently excludes income received by silent partners. Most importantly, our conclusions regarding the impact of tax-bene…t policy reforms are based on a …xed-income approach designed to control for changes in the distribution of market incomes -whether these are genuine or due to changes in the data collection process (see Section 5.2). 6 For a description of MITTS, see Creedy et al. (2002).
capital income are ignored. Gross and net incomes are computed using the tax amounts and bene…t payments calculated by MITTS. Gross income is equal to market income plus the value of bene…ts whereas net income is equal to gross income net of taxes.
The unit of analysis is the individual, where each individual in an income unit is assigned the total income of the unit per adult equivalent. Following Banks and Johnson (1994) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994) , the adult equivalent size, s, is obtained using the following parametric scales:
where n a and n c are respectively the number of adults and children in the unit, is the weight attached to children and measures the extent of economies of scale. The weight attached to children, , was set at 0.6 and the economies of scale parameter was set at =0.8. Lastly, all the results are aggregated to the population level using the weights provided with the SIHC. Source: Authors'calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data. when the redistributive e¤ect of the combined tax and bene…t system, RE N T , was above 0.22, a steady decline started so that it had fallen to around 0.17 by 2009, a decline of nearly 28 per cent. 8 Estimates of the separate contributions of taxes and bene…ts suggest that bene…ts account for most of the redistribution achieved by the …scal system.
Despite the downward trend, the contribution of bene…ts to the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-bene…t system remained above 63 per cent for the whole period under analysis.
This is in spite of the fact that the magnitude of taxes, as a proportion of income, is substantially larger than that of bene…ts. In this regard, Australia is similar to most 8 To check the robustness of these results we also estimated the redistributive e¤ects for the 2001-10 period using data from the HILDA survey. Results from this analysis available upon request yields very similar time-trends in income redistribution. See also Wilkins (2014) for a comparison of the time-trends in income redistribution using SIHC and HILDA data. advanced economies, with the notable exception of the US where the tax system plays a large role in income redistribution (Bastagli et al. 2012 ).
Both the absolute and relative contribution of bene…ts to redistribution started to decline in the early 2000s so that the equalizing e¤ect of bene…ts by the end of the decade was at its lowest level in the period under examination. As the progressivity of bene…ts barely changed over the period, this decline can be almost entirely attributed to the fall in the average bene…t rate, which declined from 16. shows that despite the emphasis on reducing the disincentives to work, the reforms to the tax-bene…t system did not lead to a reduction in the marginal e¤ective tax rates Policy reforms during the 2000s increased the conditionality of the system by tightening the access to welfare payments. In the case of unemployment, this was implemented through tougher activity tests and higher penalties for non-compliance, by extending the waiting periods for those who have accumulated some savings, and by imposing a two-year waiting period for new immigrants. Further, the eligibility criterion for the Disability and
Parenting pensions was tightened so that only individuals unable to work more than 15
hours per week and sole parents whose youngest kid is under six were eligible, respectively. As a consequence, some sole parents and people with disabilities have been shifted from pensions to allowance payments, which may have a¤ected the redistributive e¤ect of the welfare system given the growing gap between pensions and allowances caused by di¤erent rules of indexation. Before discussing these …gures, however, an explanation of how the budget constraints were constructed is in order. 10 First, for each individual of working age in the household survey, market and net incomes are computed using the tax-bene…t calculator from MITTS assuming di¤erent labour supply points ranging from 0 to 50 hours of work and using observed hourly wage rates. 11 Speci…cally, 11 labour supply points were considered for all individuals except for men in couple for whom only 6 alternatives were used. Hence, we derive between 6 and 11 points of each individual's budget constraint, which are then linked by linear extrapolation. This budget constraint, therefore, re ‡ects the transformation of market income, including labour and capital income, into net incomes for di¤erent labour supply points ranging between 0 and 50 hours. 12 The budget constraints shown in Figure 2 were derived by applying this method on data from the 2007/08 SIHC and 9 Since the late 1990s allowances have been indexed to the Consumer Price Index, while pensions are indexed to the wage index. As a consequence allowance payments have failed to keep pace with the rise in average income, with a fall of 25 to 35 per cent relative to community living standards (Gregory 2013) . 10 We are grateful to Justin van de Ven for his help in the development of this approach. 11 For those not in work, predicted wages are used, which are derived from a Mincer equation. Details of the …rst set of wage (and labour supply) parameters used in MITTS can be found in Kalb and Scutella (2002) and Kalb (2002) .
by averaging over working-age individuals using sample weights. Two sets of budget constraints are presented, corresponding to those obtained using the tax and bene…t systems of 2007/08 and 1999/2000, respectively. 13 Figure 2 reveals that the various policy reforms implemented between 1999/00 and 2007/08 contributed to increase the slopes of the ‡attest parts of the budget constraints under the 1999/00 system. In other words, the successive reductions in taper rates and income tax rates ensured that the highest METRs were reduced, in a systematic e¤ort to increase incentives to work. However, these e¤orts led to asymmetric e¤ects over the income range. As the …gures for the di¤erent groups clearly show, policy reforms acted to reduce the average e¤ective tax rate of high-income earners. In contrast, policy changes either did not a¤ect the average e¤ective tax rate at low-income levels, or even increased it in the case of singles. This was combined with a general reduction in the highest METRs, a feature which is particularly apparent for couples with children. Within this group, individuals on annual private incomes between $30,000 to $50,000, who were facing particularly high METRs under the 1999/00 system, saw large reductions in their METRs as evidenced by the increased slope of their budget constraints.
Overall, policy reforms between 1999 and 2007 acted to reduce the average e¤ective tax rate of middle and high-income households in all demographic groups. The reduction in top marginal income tax rates, the reductions in taper rates, and the increase in family tax bene…t payments are all factors that contributed to this trend. This suggests that these reforms contributed to an increase in disposable income inequality. 13 All the payment rates and thresholds from the tax and bene…t system of 1999/2000 were uprated to 2008 dollars using the ABS wage index based on average earnings for full-time workers. To some extent, the use of a common uprating factor for all payments and thresholds based on wages rather than the CPI explains why the 1999/2000 bene…t system may seem more generous than the 2007/08 system at low levels of market income in Figure 2 . This re ‡ects the decisions by policy makers to let allowances grow more slowly than market income over the period. Source: Authors'calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data.
Policy Evaluations: The Fixed-Income Approach
The study of …scal reforms and their e¤ects on redistribution is relevant from a policy point of view because it is informative about the government's actions to redistribute income and it provides valuable information for the design of future reforms. However, policy reforms are generally implemented as packages combining multiple changes, which means that their distributional consequences are far from obvious. Moreover, observed changes in income redistribution over time are the compound result of (i) trends in the distribution of market incomes and (ii) policy changes that alter the capacity of taxes and bene…ts to redistribute income. Therefore, assessing the redistributive implications of policy reforms is not a trivial task as one must be able to isolate the policy e¤ect from the e¤ect of other changes in the distribution of market income. The …xed-income approach proposed by 14 It is important to recognise, however, that this approach only isolates what we could call the immediate policy e¤ects as it does not account in any way for behavioural responses to these policy reforms, a point to which we come back below. Another key issue in this type of analysis is the sensitivity of the conclusions to the choice of the base distribution. To assess the robustness of our …ndings, we identify the policy e¤ect using three di¤erent pre-…scal income distributions as reference, those of 1999, 2000 and 2007.
We …nd that our results do not depend on the choice of the reference distribution.
Let F denote the distribution of market income and let N F ( ) represent the distribution of net income that would result from exposing the distribution F to the …scal policy . All the information required to evaluate the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-bene…t system is then summarized in the pair (F; N F ( )). The identi…cation of the policy e¤ect using the …xed-income method requires the application of the …scal policy t from the 14 Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) propose an alternative method where the policy e¤ect is identi…ed by comparing post-…scal distributions that have been adjusted to a common base regime in which di¤erences in market income inequality have been eliminated using a transplant-and-compare procedure. The aim is to address the main caveat of the …xed-income approach, which is that results can depend on the choice of the base distribution. However, this is a limitation that does not apply here as we shall see that our results are robust to the choice of the base distribution. Moreover, the transplant-and-compare approach is not as tractable as the …xed-income method, where interpretation is greatly facilitated by the simplicity of the approach. di¤erent periods t = 1; ::; T to a base distribution F B . This allows the construction of the sequence of pairs f(F B ; N F B ( t ))g T t=1 that can be used to quantify the changes in the redistributive e¤ect that would have been observed in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes. To derive the distributions of post-…scal incomes that result from applying the tax and bene…t system from di¤erent years to the common distribution we make use of the tax-bene…t calculator component of MITTS. For these simulations pre-…scal incomes are in ‡ated (or de ‡ated) to the year of the tax and bene…t system being considered by using the wage index base on average earnings for full-time workers provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 15 Where income tax parameters are varied independently of the bene…t parameters, the former are also in ‡ated (or de ‡ated) to the year of the bene…t parameters by using the same wage index. This means, however, that policy reforms can account only for a small part of the overall decline in redistributive e¤ect over the period, most of which is due to changes in market income distribution.
The results for bene…ts presented in Figure 4 indicate that reforms to the bene…t system cannot account for the large decline in the redistributive e¤ect of bene…ts over the period. In fact, the simulated series plotted in 2009 is around 5 to 10 per cent higher than in 1994. 16 Note that in contrast with bene…ts and net tax where the policy e¤ect is identi…ed holding the distribution of market income …xed, in the case of income taxes the distribution that is held …xed is that of gross income. We investigate the contribution of the tax-bene…t policy reforms since the mid-1990s to the observed decline in income redistribution. Previous studies by Whiteford (2010 Whiteford ( , 2013 and Wilkins (2014) are descriptive in essence and do not consider the role of policy changes as they are based on summary measures of redistribution that confound changes in the distribution of pre-…scal income with the impact of policy reforms. We isolate the e¤ect of tax-bene…t policies using the …xed-income approach that allows intertemporal comparisons of policies by applying the tax and bene…t schemes of di¤erent periods to a common distribution of market incomes. Our results indicate that net income inequality would have increased even in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes.
This implies that policy reforms contributed to the decline in the redistributive capacity of the …scal system. However, policy reforms only account for a small part of the decline in income redistribution, most of which was explained by changes in the distribution of market incomes.
Although useful to isolate the immediate impact of policy reforms, the …xed-income analysis provides no insight on the other factors underlying the changes in income redistribution. In particular, it remains silent about the factors behind the changes in market incomes and the extent to which these are induced by behavioral responses to policy reforms. Shedding light on these issues calls for the development of new and more complex analytical approaches. This is the subject of much-needed ongoing research (see Bargain 2012, Creedy and Herault 2011 and Herault and Azpitarte 2014).
